by the 42nd amendment in 1976, there were no doubts that the Constitution was both socialist and secular from the very beginning p.27. ''The social revolution meant, 'to get (India) out of the medievalism based on birth, religion, custom, and community and reconstruct her social structure on modern foundations of law, individual merit, and social education'.'' (Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation, p.26, quoting K. Santhanam, a member of the Constituent Assembly.) 10 Granville Austin, Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, p.50 14 See, for example, Constitution art.15(2) (right of non-discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any one of them to access and use of public places, etc.); art.15(4) (special provision for advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes); art.16 (equality of opportunity in matters of public employment); art.19 (rights regarding six freedoms); art.29 (protection of interests of minorities).
individual against the action of other private citizen'': Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation, p.51. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the protection of even arts 24 and 29(1) could be invoked against private individuals. See also Vijayashri Sripati, ''Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950 Ahead ( -2000 ' ' (1998) (2002) 5 S.C.C. 111. In the application of the instrumentality test to a corporation, it is immaterial whether the corporation is created by or under a statute. Som Prakash Rekhi v Union of India AIR 1981SC 212. 19 The Fundamental Rights are judicially enforceable whereas the Directive Principles are unenforceable in the courts. controversy in Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India where the Court held that the, ''harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution''. 23 Since then the judiciary has employed DPs to derive the contents of various FRs.
24
The founding fathers envisaged ''the judiciary as a bastion of rights and justice''. 25 An independent judiciary armed with the power of judicial review was the constitutional device chosen to achieve this objective. The power to enforce the FRs was conferred on both the Supreme Court and the High Courts 26 -the courts that have entertained all the PIL cases. The judiciary can test not only the validity of laws and executive actions but also of constitutional amendments. It has the final say on the interpretation of the Constitution and its orders, supported with the power to punish for contempt, can reach everyone throughout the territory of the country. Since its inception, the Supreme Court has delivered judgments of far-reaching importance involving not only adjudication of disputes but also determination of public policies and establishment of rule of law and constitutionalism. PIL cases there were no immediate or quick solutions, the Court developed ''creeping'' jurisdiction thereby issuing appropriate interim orders and directions. 38 The judiciary also emphasized that PIL is not an adversarial but a collaborative and cooperative project in which all concerned parties should work together to realize the human rights of disadvantaged sections of society.
(4) THE THREE PHASES OF PIL
At the risk of over-simplification and overlap, the PIL discourse in India could be divided, in my view, into three broad phases. 40 One will notice that these three phases differ from each other in terms of at least the following four variables: who initiated PIL cases; what was the subject matter/focus of PIL; against whom the relief was sought; and how judiciary responded to PIL cases.
The First Phase:

In the first phase-which began in the late 1970s and continued through the 1980s-the PIL cases
were generally filed by public-spirited persons (lawyers, journalists, social activists or academics).
Most of the cases related to the rights of disadvantaged sections of society such as child labourers, bonded labourers, prisoners, mentally challenged, pavement dwellers, and women. The relief was sought against the action or non-action on the part of executive agencies resulting in violations of FRs under the Constitution. During this phase, the judiciary responded by recognizing the rights of these people and giving directions to the government to redress the alleged violations. arguable that in the first phase, the PIL truly became an instrument of the type of social transformation/revolution that the founding fathers had expected to achieve through the Constitution.
The Second Phase:
The second phase of the PIL was in the 1990s during which several significant changes in the chemistry of PIL took place. In comparison to the first phase, the filing of PIL cases became more institutionalized in that several specialized NGOs and lawyers started bringing matters of public interest to the courts on a much regular basis. The breadth of issues which were raised in PIL also expanded tremendously-from the protection of environment to corruption-free administration, right to education, sexual harassment at the workplace, relocation of industries, rule of law, good governance, and the general accountability of the Government. It is to be noted that in this phase, the petitioners sought relief not only against the action/non-action of the executive but also against private individuals, in relation to policy matters and regarding something that would clearly fall within the domain of the legislature. The response of the judiciary during the second phase was by and large much bolder and unconventional than the first phase. For instance, the courts did not hesitate to come up with detailed guidelines where there were legislative gaps. The courts enforced
FRs against private individuals and granted relief to the petitioner without going into the question of whether the violator of the FR was the state. The courts also took non-compliance with its orders more seriously and in some cases, went to the extent of monitoring government investigative agencies and/or punishing civil servants for contempt for failing to abide by their directions. The second phase was also the period when the misuse of PIL not only began but also reached to a disturbing level, which occasionally compelled the courts to impose fine on plaintiffs for misusing PIL for private purposes.
It is thus apparent that in the second phase the PIL discourse broke new grounds and chartered on previously unknown paths in that it moved much beyond the declared objective for which PIL was meant. The courts, for instance, took resort to judicial legislation when needed, did not hesitate to reach centres of government power, tried to extend the protection of FRs against non-state actors, moved to protect the interests of the middle class rather than poor populace, and sought means to control the misuse of PIL for ulterior purposes.
The Third Phase:
On the other hand, the third phase-the current phase, which began with the 21st century-is a period in which anyone could file a PIL for almost anything. It seems that there is a further expansion of issues that could be raised as PIL, e.g. calling back the Indian cricket team from the Australia tour and preventing an alleged marriage of an actress with trees for astrological reasons.
From the judiciary's point of view, one could argue that it is time for judicial introspection and for reviewing what courts tried to achieve through PIL. As compared to the second phase, the judiciary has seemingly shown more restraint in issuing directions to the government. Although the judiciary is unlikely to roll back the expansive scope of PIL, it is possible that it might make more measured interventions in the future.
One aspect that stands out in the third phase deserves a special mention. 
is not chosen by the people and is not responsible to them in the sense in which the House of People is. However, it will win for itself a permanent place in the hearts of the people and augment its moral authority if it can shift the focus of judicial review from the numerical concept of minority protection to the humanitarian concept of the protection of the weaker section of the people.''
It is submitted that courts should refrain from perceiving themselves as crusaders constitutionally obliged to redress all failures of democracy. Neither they have this authority nor could they achieve this goal.
(4) Symbolic justice: Another major problem with the PIL project in India has been of PIL cases often doing only symbolic justice. Moreover, there has been a lack of consistency as well in that in some cases, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to intrude on policy questions but in other cases it hid behind the shield of policy questions. Just to illustrate, the judiciary intervened to tackle sexual harassment as well as custodial torture and to regulate the adoption of children by foreigners, but it did not intervene to introduce a uniform civil code, to combat ragging in educational institutions, to adjust the height of the Narmada dam and to provide a humane face to liberalization-disinvestment polices. No clear or sound theoretical basis for such selective intervention is discernable from judicial decisions.
It is also suspect if the judiciary has been (or would be) able to enhance the accountability of the other two wings of the government through PIL. In fact, the reverse might be true: the judicial usurpation of executive and legislative functions might make these institutions more unaccountable, for they know that judiciary is always there to step in should they fail to act. 48 Prof. Jain M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, Volume 2, 6 th edn., LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 2010 Based on the above problems, certain solutions need to be devised and implemented by the Judiciary to ensure that the sanctity of Judicial Activism in the country is kept intact and at the same time interests of all classes of stakeholders are addressed in a proper and judicious manner.
(6) SUGGESTIONS TO CORRECT AN "OVER-ACTIVIST" JUDICIARY
Major steps need to be taken in order to prevent an "over-activist" judiciary from transgressing its limits. Some of these can be explained as follows: Public interest litigation, or PIL as it is conveniently called, has become a major and prominent segment of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and 21 High Courts in India. Whilst its necessity and utility in upholding the rule of law is undoubted, its extravagant and unprincipled use at times by courts has brought PIL into controversy (1) Relaxation must be procedural
Much of the misapplication of the PIL jurisdiction can be avoided, if it is remembered that PIL is basically the application of the well settled principles of judicial review by courts of actions of government and public authorities, with the modification of courts allowing the petitioner(s) applicant to approach the court on behalf of other persons, who themselves are unable to come to the court because of ignorance of their rights or the difficulty and cost of litigation. In such cases, the court relaxes the strict rule of locus standi of the applicant and also relaxes procedural formalities. It may even entertain a letter addressed to the court by a complainant. PIL was devised as a means for redressing the basic rights of generally the poor and marginalized sections of the society, who were unable to get judicial help on their own. It must also be borne in mind that public interest litigation is not something unique to India. Other jurisdictions such as South Africa, Canada and USA 50 also have public interest litigation, though it is not described as such. It is, therefore, important to note that except for procedural relaxations, the PIL jurisdiction should not exceed the permissible limits and parameters of judicial review by the court over the actions or omissions of government, legislatures or public bodies, or transcend the basic separation of powers underlying the Constitution. Judicial review in a democratic constitution must also not supplant the normal processes of representative self-government, in which the representatives of the people make choices and policies which may not be ideal or correct, but which can be set right by the people themselves. What is not within the bounds of judicial review by courts cannot be within their reach because it comes under the description of public interest litigation before it. PIL jurisdiction is, therefore, not a unique jurisdiction by which courts can transcend their limitations to act as a body to set right actions of the government, which are believed to be wrong or could be improved. Once this basic foundation of PIL is kept in mind, the parameters of intervention in PIL are easily grasped and its misapplication can be seen and avoided.
(2) Judicial Activism not PIL:
Another misconception is equating PIL with judicial activism in India. Judicial activism is not PIL. Article 32 seems to have lost its meaning for all practical purposes.
At times, matters beyond the judicial sphere and competence of the court have been entertained. In 1993, the Supreme Court even ordered that provision of food of 1200 calorific value should be supplied to hostages in an ongoing military operation in Kashmir. The court has professed to monitor a highly technical engineering scheme of interlinking of rivers in India and of genetic modified foods. In the field of higher education, the court's interventions have created a maze of complex regulations by successive cases, familiar only to lawyers, and baffling to educationists, parents and students. The court's scheme for admissions in private medical colleges in the Unnikrishnan case in 1993, which was in distinguishable from legislation, prevailed for nine years before it suffered an inglorious end, when the court itself struck it down as "unconstitutional" in 
